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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Criminal Law-Enhanced Punishment- Allegation and
Proof of the Law of a Foreign State
Indictment charged Relator with assault with intent to murder
with malice and to enhance the punishment alleged that he pre-
viously had been "duly and legally" convicted of "assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to commit murder, upon an information
then legally pending . . ." in Arizona. Indictment was attacked by
habeas corpus. Held: The lack of a formal allegation in an indict-
ment that a felony can be prosecuted in another state upon an in-
formation and the lack of proof of this fact do not render the
indictment and sentence void but only voidable since they are only
defects of form.1 Ex parte Sistrunk, - Tex. Crim. -, 349 S.W.2d
728 (1961).
The Texas Penal Code articles which authorize enhanced punish-
ment in misdemeanor' and felony' cases point out one way of dealing
with habitual offenders, i.e., by giving them a more severe or "en-
hanced" punishment than a first offender would receive. This cus-
tomary approach4 has been used in Texas since the first revision of
the penal code.' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has called
these enhancement statutes "reform" statutes,' declared that they were
constitutional,7 and stated that they do not cause a defendant to
be put in jeopardy twice.' Under articles 62' and 63,'0 to obtain a
' It must be kept in mind that habeas corpus is not available to question errors of form,
i.e., voidable errors. Such defects can be attacked only by motion to quash during the trial
or on appeal and cannot be raised by collateral attack. Although habeas corpus can never
be substituted for an appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has the power and the
duty to prevent enforcement of a judgment which has been obtained in a criminal case
under circumstances and conditions which constitute a denial of due process of law. Ex parte
McCune, 156 Tex. Crim. 213, 246 S.W.2d 171 (1952). The classification of a defect as
one of form or substance determines the legal conclusions which will dispose of this point of
a case.
'Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 61 (1952).
'Tex. Pen. Code Ann. arts. 62, 63 (1952).
4 See Annots., 58 A.L.R. 64 (1920); 82 A.L.R. 306 (1933); 116 A.L.R. 229 (1938);
132 A.L.R. 107 (1942) for the provisions of other states.
'Tex. Rev. Pen. Code arts. 818-20 (1879).
'Ellis v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 346, 115 S.W.2d 660 (1938) ("Reform" means to cor-
rect, to make new, or to rectify.).
7Enhancement statutes create no offense and the defendant cannot complain that the
enhancement count fails to define an offense with the particularity required under the Texas
Constitution. Kinney v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 500, 79 S.W. 570 (1904).
' Defendant is not punished again for the same offense. The fact of prior conviction is
only used as evidence to increase his punishment. Ellison v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 406, 227
S.W.2d 545 (1950); Sigler v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 220, 157 S.W.2d 903 (1941); Williams
v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 450, 5 S.W.2d 514 (1928); Kinney v. State, supra note 7.
'Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 62 (1952):
If it be shown on the trial of a felony less than capital that the defendant
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valid conviction, both the prior conviction (or convictions) and the
principal crime must be felonies, and each must be less than capital.
Article 62 requires that the enhancing conviction must be "the
same offense or one of like nature," but there is no such requirement
in article 63. The enhanced punishment is set by statute and not left
to the discretion of the jury.1 Article 62 specifies the maximum
punishment allowed for the principal crime upon showing that this
is the second conviction," while 63 calls for life imprisonment for a
third offender." The case law, through interpretation of the purpose
and the language of the statutes, provides some additional require-
ments which are not specifically set forth in the statutes. For ex-
ample, two or more convictions on the same day in the same court
are to be considered but one conviction for enhancement purposes."
Thus, the statute contemplates only successive convictions." Further-
more, valid and final disposition of the case is required for a con-
viction, 6 which does not become final until the appeal is determined.
Finally, federal conviction or a conviction from another state is
available to enhance a Texas crime if the crime committed in that
jurisdiction would constitute a felony under Texas law. s
In order to gain a valid enhanced punishment it is necessary to
allege certain essential elements in the indictment: (1) a prior con-
viction, 9 (2) for the same offense or one of like character" (for
article 62 only) and (3) for a crime which is a felony under the laws
of Texas." The omission of any one of these allegations is fatal, and
has been before convicted of the same offense, or one of the same nature, the
punishment on such second or other subsequent conviction shall be the highest
which is affixed to the commission of such offenses in ordinary cases.
'°Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 63 (1952):
Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than capital
shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary.
"Tex. Pen. Code Ann. arts. 62, 63 (1952).
12Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 62 (1952):
[T]he punishment . . . shall be the highest which is affixed to the com-
mission of such offense in ordinary cases.
"Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 63 (1952).
14 Long v. State, 36 Tex. 6 (1871); Ex parte Huff, 166 Tex. Crim. 508, 316 S.W.2d
896 (1958).
"Ex parte Holley, 170 Tex. Crim. 206, 339 S.W.2d 903 (1960); Arbuckle v. State,
132 Tex. Crim. 371, 375, 105 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1937).
"9Heard v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 19, 184 S.W.2d 285 (1944); Newsom v. State, 136
Tex. Crim. 114, 123 S.W.2d 887 (1938).
'7Arbuckle v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 371, 375, 105 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1937).
"9Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 145 S.W.2d 180 (1940).
"9 See cases cited note 15 supra.
'°Granado v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 525, 531, 329 S.W.2d 864, 868 (1959); Therrell
v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 67, 289 S.W.2d 578 (1956); Belton v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 7,
91 S.W.2d 728 (1936).
"Ex parte Scafe, - Tex. Crim. -, 334 S.W.2d 170 (1960); Green v. State, 165
Tex. Crim. 46, 303 S.W.2d 392 (1957); Clifton v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 655, 246 S.W.2d
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renders the indictment void. That the enhancing crime is a felony
less than capital should also be alleged to avoid a motion to quash
at the trial, but such an omission is not sufficient to make the indict-
ment void." The sufficiency of the indictment is determined by the
allegations therein and not by the proof offered at the trial. As
noted, a former conviction in another state is available for enhance-
ment purposes in Texas, but the indictment must show on its face
that the enhancing crime would be a felony under Texas law.""
Thus, it was held in Ex parte Puckett" that a federal conviction for
a violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act" was not
available to enhance the punishment of a later felony conviction,
since there was no showing that the federal violation would be a
felony under Texas law.
The same problem is presented in a slightly different context when
the allegation mentions a legal proceeding in another state. The Texas
rule is clear that the law of another state is presumed to be the same
as the Texas law unless there are specific allegations to the contrary."
Thus, in an analagous proceeding, the allegations in an affidavit to
support an extradition proceeding have been held to be insufficient
when they alleged a felony to be prosecuted upon an information
in Colorado."8 In that case there were no allegations that the law of
Colorado authorized felony prosecution upon an information, and
Texas law expressly prohibits prosecution of felonies upon an in-
formation. 9 Hence, with the presumption that the Colorado law is
the same as Texas law under these circumstances, the allegations were
declared insufficient to support an extradition proceeding.
Since this is the first time this exact point has been before a Texas
court, the soundness and clarity of the decision are particularly im-
portant. The court in the majority opinion disposed of the attack
upon the indictment by stating several general principals of law
which are supported by the authorities cited and which represent
201 (1951); Clark v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 581, 230 S.W.2d 234 (1950); Arnold v. State,
127 Tex. Crim. 89, 74 S.W.2d 997 (1934).
22Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 59 (1952); Ex parte Seymour, 137 Tex. Crim. 103, 128
S.W.2d 46 (1939).
23Donald v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 252, 306 S.W.2d 360 (1957).
24 See cases cited note 21 supra.
21 165 Tex. Crim. 605, 310 S.W.2d 117 (1958).
26 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (1958); see Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1430 (1952).
27 Ex parte Burns, 167 Tex. Crim. 533, 322 S.W.2d 289 (1959); Green v. State, 165
Tex. Crim. 46, 303 S.W.2d 392 (1957); Ex parte Cooper, 163 Tex. Crim. 642, 295 S.W.2d
906 (1956); Ex parte Peairs, 162 Tex. Crim. 243, 283 S.W.2d 755 (1955); Ex parle
Gardner, 159 Tex. Crim. 365, 264 S.W.2d 125 (1954).
2' Ex parte Cooper, supra note 27.
29 Tex. Const. art. V, § 10.
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rules well-established in Texas law.30 However, questions do arise
as to their applicability to the instant set of facts, since in effect,
the defect here is considered no more serious than a misspelling of
the accused's name in the indictment. The majority considers this
case as an attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence and holds the
judgment not subject to collateral attack, although the record is
completely devoid of any evidence as to the laws of Arizona and
similarly lacks any allegation that Arizona law permits felony prose-
cution on an information. The dissent offers no more insight into
the problem by stating that the defects are of form only and by
citing cases which assertively permit (1) the subsequent attacks by
habeas corpus alleging only defects of form,31 and (2) the considera-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence upon collateral attack." These
cases do not seem to stand for such propositions, and if they did,
they would stand alone in the law on these points, contrary to the
great weight of authority.33 However, the dissent's analysis of the
Puckett decision seems to be accurate and carefully considered."
Puckett is clear authority for holding the defect in the indictment
in the instant case to be one of substance. Even if it is argued that
the indictment contained implied allegations that Arizona law per-
mitted felony prosecutions upon an information, the sentence should
still be held void because the record contains absolutely no proof
offered to sustain such an allegation."
The court evidently did not consider the result of its holding that
the lack of formal allegation that a felony can be prosecuted in
another state upon an information is only a defect of form, for the
effect of this ruling is that a trial judge can take judicial notice of
" Neither an attack on sufficiency of evidence or the form of the indictment may be
made by habeas corpus proceeding after the conviction has become final. Ex parte Lyles,
168 Tex. Crim. 145, 323 S.W.2d 950 (1959); Ex Parle Seymour, 137 Tex. Crim. 103, 128
S.W.2d 46 (1939).
SLEx parte Daniels, 158 Tex. Crim. 2, 252 S.W.2d 586 (1952).3 2 Ex parte Bush, 166 Tex. Crim. 259, 313 S.W.2d 287 (1958).
" Sufficiency of the evidence can never be challenged by habeas corpus. Ex Parte Lyles,
168 Tex. Crim. 145, 323 S.W.2d 950 (1959); Ex Parte Wingfield, 162 Tex. Crim. 112, 282
S.W.2d 219 (1955). Defects of form cannot be questioned by habeas corpus. Ex Parte
Pruitt, 139 Tex. Crim. 438, 141 S.W.2d 333 (1940); Ex Parte Helton, 128 Tex. Crim. 112,
79 S.W.2d 139 (1935).
"' Although there is some authority holding that the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,
18 U.S.C. 5§ 2312-13 (1958), is unavailable to enhance punishment of crimes committed in
some states, there is no Texas case which so holds. The acts denounced by § 2313 of the
federal act would be a crime in Texas under Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1430 (1952). If the
property "concealed [and] received," were valued at more than $50, such crime would be
a felony in Texas. If the federal conviction in the Puckett case were under § 2312 or under
§ 2313, but the property were valued at less than $50, then the conviction would not con-
stitute a felony under Texas law and would not be available for enhancing a subsequent
conviction.
35 The state has the burden of proof in criminal prosecutions.
[Vol. 16
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the law of another state by saying that the lack of such allegations
do not make the indictment void. This result is clearly contrary to
the established rule in Texas;3" yet the opinion states, "We announce
no new rule of law and construe none."37 The rules of criminal
pleadings in Texas are technical. An indictment must begin "in the
name and by authority of the State of Texas" to be sufficient to
support a conviction. Omission of the words "of Texas" has been
held fatal. Furthermore, the omission of "by" and "authority"
likewise makes the indictment void." With such particularity and
formality required in case after case, it seems inconsistent for the
Court of Criminal Appeals now to hold that it is unnecessary to
plead and prove specific facts which show that an enhancing crime
is a felony under Texas law when the pleading is inconsistent upon
its face with such an interpretation. The most reasonable and im-
portant of all the requisites under article 3960 is that the indictment
must allege a crime under the laws of Texas. However, after
Sistrunk, it is not necessary to allege a prior conviction of a crime
which would be a felony under Texas law. Even if the courts con-
clude that Texas criminal cases are to be decided with more emphasis
on the merits and less emphasis on technicalities, an individual should
still be charged with a crime of the proper grade required by the
statute if he is to be incarcerated for an enhanced period.
William M. Boyd
Admiralty-Texas Wrongful Death and Survival
Statutes-Unseaworthiness and Comparative
Negligence
Plaintiff's husband, a longshoreman, was fatally injured during un-
loading operations aboard Defendant's vessel. Plaintiff for herself and
two minor children sought damages under maritime law as supple-
mented by the Texas Wrongful Death Act1 and the Texas Survival
36 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 173 (1956).
37 349 S.W.2d at 729.
a8Saine v. State, 14 Tex. Crim. 144 (1883).
39Brown v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 572, 81 S.W. 718 (1904).
4 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (1954).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4671, 4672 (1940). Article 4672 (character of wrong-
ful act) states:
The wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, unskillfulness or default men-
tioned in the preceding article must be of such character as would, if death




Statute,' charging in the alternative negligence and unseaworthiness.
The jury found unseaworthiness and negligence of the vessel's crew.
Each was found to be a proximate cause of the decedent's death, and
the decedent was found to be five per cent contributorily negligent.'
The trial court, because of the contributory negligence, entered judg-
ment for the Defendant. The court of civil appeals affirmed in part,
holding that contributory negligence barred recovery under the Texas
Wrongful Death Act. However, it reversed in part, holding that the
Texas Survival Statute preserved to the statutory beneficiaries of the
decedent all of the rights that he had prior to his death, including the
general maritime law doctrines of unseaworthiness and comparative
negligence.4 Held, reversed and remanded in part: In an action under
the Wrongful Death Statute, if general maritime law doctrines of
unseaworthiness and comparative negligence would have applied in
favor of the decedent had he lived, then these doctrines will apply
in favor of his representatives, and contributory negligence of the
decedent may be considered only in mitigation of damages. Vassallo
v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, - Tex. -, 344 S.W.2d
421 (1961).
The doctrines of unseaworthiness and comparative negligence have
long been a part of the admiralty law as applied to seamen in non-
fatal personal injury cases.' Originally negligence was regarded as a
necessary component of unseaworthiness, but today the shipowner's
duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute and is completely
divorced from concepts of negligence.! The protection afforded by
these doctrines was extended to longshoremen in non-fatal personal
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (1958) (survival of cause of action):
All causes of action upon which suit has been or may hereafter be brought
for personal injuries, or for injuries resulting in death, whether such injuries
be to the health or to the reputation, or to the person of the injured party,
shall not abate by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause
of action shall have accrued, nor by reason of the death of such injured per-
son, but, in the case of the death of either or both, all such causes of action
shall survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives and estate
of such injured party and against the person, or persons liable for such injuries
and his or their legal representatives, and may be instituted and prosecuted
as if such person or persons against whom same accrued were alive.
'The jury awarded $15,000 damages for pain and suffering of the decedent before
death under the Survival Statute and $137,170 damages under the Wrongful Death Act.
4 337 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960-Eastland). As a result Plaintiffs were awarded
the $15,000 damages for pain and suffering of the decedent before death.
'E.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (dictum); see generally Gilmore & Black,
Admiralty 248-62 (1957). "The unseaworthiness indemnity was looked on as an American
innovation, which had perhaps been stimulated by the English Merchants' Shipping Act of
1876 which allowed such recovery .... " Id. at 250.
'Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), noted, 15 Sw. L.J. 328 (1961).
But see Ezekial v. Volusia S.S. Co., 297 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 16
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injury cases by the United States Supreme Court in 1946.7 However,
under the general maritime law there is no cause of action for death
unless specifically created by statute.! Seamen's survivors have been
given actions for wrongful death by the Jones Act" and the Death
on the High Seas Act. 0 These acts, however, are not applicable to a
longshoreman's survivors under the facts in the instant case." The
survivors of a decedent, fatally injured as a result of a maritime tort,
may seek recovery under the applicable state wrongful death statute,
but the proper substantive law to be applied is a question of state
law." The problem is complicated by the fact that under the law of
some states, such as Texas, there are two separate and distinct causes
of action which survivors of a decedent may bring. The first, the
decedent's cause of action for pain and suffering from the time of
his injury until the time of his death, is preserved for his survivors by
the Survival Statute." The second, created by the Wrongful Death
Act, gives the survivors a cause of action in their own right for
damages they have suffered as a result of decedent's death.' The state
may apply the substantive law generally applicable to wrongful death
cases within its territory, or it may choose to incorporate the general
maritime law concepts of unseaworthiness or comparative negli-
gence."
The state wrongful death and survival statutes are by no means
uniform. The problem is further complicated by the relative scarcity
of decisions. Although federal and state courts have concurrent juris-
diction over maritime torts which result in death and which occur in
'Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
'Goett v. Union Carbide Co., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314 (1960); United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959);
The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
941 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). The Jones Act is the admiralty ver-
sion of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 53 Star. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1958).
"041 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-66 (1958).
"The Jones Act affords no basis for relief because the decedent-longshoreman was em-
ployed by the stevedoring contractor rather than being employed by the vessel or as a
member of its crew. The Death on the High Seas Act is inapplicable because that act re-
quires that the accident from which death results must occur beyond a marine league from
the shore of any state.
" Goett v. Union Carbide Co., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook
Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588
(1959).
"E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Ooley, 46 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932-
Eastland) error dism.
'"Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Hix, 291 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926-El Paso)
no writ hist., quoting St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
'" Goett v. Union Carbide Co., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook
Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588
(1959).
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state navigable waters," most actions have been brought in the federal
courts. The federal court decisions interpreting state statutes, though
persuasive, are not binding on the state courts.' The statutes of
Florida,'" Kentucky," Louisiana," New York," Ohio," and Pennsyl-
vania" have been interpreted to incorporate contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery in maritime tort death cases. The statutes of
Delaware, 4 Maryland,"2 New Jersey,"6 and Virginia 7 have been re-
cently construed to incorporate the general maritime substantive law
in such cases." The Texas Legislature has repeatedly rejected a broad
application of the doctrine of comparative negligence." But in limited
areas where specific statutory remedies have replaced the common
law, such as workmen's compensation' and claims under the railroad
acts,31 contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery. Federal courts
have on three occasions held that under the Texas Wrongful Death
' An action for wrongful death as a result of a maritime tort may be brought in a
federal court under its admiralty jurisdiction, 62 Stat. 931 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1958), or its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958), but
not under its jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). It
has been long established that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such cases.
American S. B. Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1873). See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d
1296, 1306-10 (1960).
"TErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prod. Co., 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960); Graham
v. Lusi, 204 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953).
"Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1937).
"Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., 227 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1955); Babin v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 94 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1957) (dictum).
as Section 131 of the Decedent Estate Law (1949) specifically provides that in actions
for wrongful death contributory negligence is a defense.
"Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Co., 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957).
"Hill v. Waterman S.S. Co., 251 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1958); Curtis v. Garcia, 241 F.2d
30 (3d Cir. 1957).
"Wright v. Cion Corp., 171 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"See Maryland ex rel Smith v. The A/S Nabella, 176 F. Supp. 668 (D. Md. 1959);
Maryland ex rel Gladden v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 176 F. Supp. 664 (D. Md. 1959).
"
6
The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 588 (1959);
Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds, 358 U.S. 613 (1958).
"Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1959).
"Cases holding that contributory negligence is not a bar to a claim for wrongful death
caused by a maritime tort which were decided before The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S.
588 (1959), are apt to be misleading. Such cases often proceeded on the theory that in a
federal admiralty court the substantive law governing an action for death caused by a mari-
time tort within a state's territorial waters was supplied by federal maritime law, and only
the remedy is provided by the wrongful death statute of the state in which the accident
occurred. These cases can no longer be regarded as authority. See, e.g., The Devona, 1 F.2d
482 (D. Me. 1924) (Maine wrongful death statute); see also Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1296,
1314 (1960).
"Bills embodying comparative negligence have been introduced in the Texas House of
Representatives on five occasions, but none of the bills ever reached a vote. See H.B. 122
(1959); H.B. 228 (1957); H.B. 101 (1953); H.B. 390 (1951); H.B. 462 (1941).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306 (1956).
", Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 6388, 6440 (1926).
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Act and the Survival Statute contributory negligence of the decedent
is a complete bar to recovery in cases involving death from maritime
torts occurring in the territorial waters of Texas." The instant case,
however, is one of first impression for the Supreme Court of Texas.
In the instant case the reasoning of the court of civil appeals,
which the supreme court affirmed, in awarding recovery under the
Survival Statute was that "no new cause of action is created by the
Survival Statute but that it simply preserves for the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased the same cause of action and rights
which he possessed at the time of his death.""3 In examining the issue
of recovery under the Wrongful Death Act, the supreme court rea-
soned, "The answer to the question presented hinges on our construc-
tion of the Texas Statutes involved.""4 The court then declined to
follow the construction accepted by the Fifth Circuit in 1926.2
Instead, it quoted s portions of a 1959 opinion of the Fourth Circuit
interpreting a substantially similar Virginia statute: "[T]his statute
was intended . .. to grant recovery in all instances where a decedent
would have recovered. The statute appears not to concern itself with
which law, local or maritime, would have supported the recovery, but
only whether there would have been a recovery."3 '
In applying the doctrine of comparative negligence to unseaworthi-
ness the court merely followed the traditional approach taken by
admiralty courts. 8 However, the current maritime decisions them-
selves are subject to possible question in allowing set-off for contribu-
tory negligence against a claim for unseaworthiness. As long as un-
seaworthiness was thought to be based on negligence,3 comparative
-negligence was unquestionably applicable. However, in 1960 the
United States Supreme Court held in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc."
that a shipowner's duty to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reason-
ably fit for their intended use is absolute and that liability for un-
seaworthiness is completely divorced from concepts of negligence.
Since the duty is now absolute and liability for its breach is incurred
without fault, there appears to be little reason for an application of
32Graff v. Parker Bros. & Co., 204 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1953); Truelson v. Whitney &
Bodden Shipping Co., 10 F.2d 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 661 (1926); The
Nellie B., 174 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
33337 S.W.2d at 313.
34 Tex. at -_, 344 S.W.2d at 424.
3" Truelson v. Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co., 10 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1926).
38 Tex. at -, 344 S.W.2d at 424.
" Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1959).
38 See cases cited note 42 infra.
39 See 15 Sw. L.J. 328 (1961).
40362 U.S. 539 (1960).
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comparative negligence. In the seaman's right to maintenance and
cure, another form of absolute liability in maritime law, contributory
negligence has no bearing.4' Nevertheless, the admiralty courts have
continued to apply comparative negligence to diminish recovery for
unseaworthiness without questioning its continued applicability."
Surely that policy is entitled to critical re-examination now that
the liability for unseaworthiness is absolute.
This case presented an excellent opportunity for the court to hold
contributory negligence a bar to recovery, since Texas had as much
federal court authority as any state to this effect and since there was
a clear record of rejection of comparative negligence by the legisla-
ture. Nevertheless, the decision as made is both sound and humane.
If the injuries had not been fatal and Plaintiff's husband had survived
with permanent and total disability, he could unquestionably have
recovered in admiralty damages for loss in earning power with con-
sequent protection to his family.4" There seems to be no sound basis
for denying recovery to a decedent's family who have been com-
pletely deprived of his earning power and companionship by death.
Thus, the instant case is one more step in the gradual but perceptible
movement to lessen the harshness of the contributory negligence
doctrine.
David C. Briggs
Primary Jurisdiction-Concurrent Jurisdiction in the
Court and the Railroad Commisson-Judicial
Discretion in Exercising Jurisdiction
Defendant, owner of an oil and gas lease on .42 acres, drilled a
gas well and attempted to "sand fracture"1 the common formation
41 E.g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
42Merrill v. The S.S. Cuaco, 189 F. Supp. 321 (D. Ore. 1960); Cooper v. D/S A/S
Progress, 188 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Oddenes v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 188 F.
Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.
Va. 1960) (on remand).
The following rationale has been offered to explain why contributory negligence is not
a defense in cases of strict liability:
The explanation must lie in part ...upon the policy which places the absolute
responsibility for preventing the harm upon the defendant, whether his con-
duct is regarded as fundamentally anti-social, or he is considered merely to
be in a better position to transfer the loss to the community. Prosser, Torts
341 (1955).
4Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Even if the action were brought
in a state court, contributory negligence should not be a bar to recovery. Norris, The Law
of Maritime Personal Injuries Affecting Harbor Workers, Passengers, and Visitors 105-06
(1959), citing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
1 Sand fracturing is a process whereby sand and a liquid are mixed and forced under
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which underlay the surrounding property owned by Plaintiff. Plain-
tiff, alleging that the cracks or veins caused by sand fracturing would
extend into the common formation under the land which it had
leased and that this would amount to a subsurface trespass, brought
suit to enjoin Defendant. Defendant claimed that: (1) the matter
must first be determined by the Railroad Commission of Texas be-
cause that administrative body had primary jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter; and (2) the holding of the Commission could then be
appealed to the district court and there tested by the substantial evi-
dence rule.2 Held: The primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply
and the district court is not ousted from jurisdiction over the in-
herently judicial problem of trespass. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil
Corp., -Tex.-, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines whether a court or
an administrative agency should make an initial decision.' The foun-
tainhead from which the primary jurisdiction doctrine flows is the
case of Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.4 The doctrine
applies where the enforcement of a claim originally cognizable in the
courts requires the resolution of issues which under a regulatory
scheme have been placed within the special competence of an adminis-
trative body.' In such a case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.' The
very high pressure into gas-bearing sand thereby causing the formation to be cracked so
that the gas may flow from the producing formation into the well.
This rule . . . means that in most cases of direct attack upon administrative
orders, by statutory appeal or by special writ, the trial court is limited to
the determination of whether, from all the evidence adduced in the trial of
the cause before the court, the action of the agency is illegal, arbitrary, or
capricious, or is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. If reasonable
minds could not have reached the conclusion that the agency must have
reached in order to justify its action, the order must be set aside. Harris,
The Administrative Law of Texas, 29 Texas L. Rev. 213, 225 (1950).
'Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); Far East Conference
v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752
(1947); Thompson v. Texas-Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946).
4204 U.S. 426 (1907). An oil company sued a railroad to recover charges paid in
excess of what was just and reasonable, also alleging that the rate was discriminatory, pre-
ferential, and in violation of the long and short haul provisions. The Court said:
[A] shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the es-
tablished rate must . . . primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, which body alone is vested with power originally to enter-
tain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule, because the rates
fixed therein are unreasonable. . . . Id. at 448. (Emphasis added.)
The Court reasoned that if courts and juries could determine reasonableness of rates, uni-
formity would be impossible. The Court further said that initial jurisdiction in the courts
would destroy the prohibition against preferences and discrimination, and afford, moreover,
a ready means by which, through collusive proceedings, the wrongs which the statute was
intended to remedy could be successfully inflicted.
'United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
6 Ibid.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
doctrine is judge-made, and the principal criterion in deciding
whether the doctrine is applicable is judicial appraisal of the need for
resort to administrative judgment.' Questions of when the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is applicable arise only when the statutory
arrangements are such that jurisdictions of administrative and judicial
bodies are concurrent for an initial determination of some questions.!
If there is exclusive jurisdiction in either the courts or the agency,
then no question of primary jurisdiction arises.' The principal reason
behind the doctrine is recognition of the need for orderly and sensible
cooperation of the work of agencies and courts."0 Whether the agency
happens to be expert or not, a court should not act upon subject
matter that is peculiarly within the agency's specialized field without
taking into account the agency's approach, for otherwise, parties who
are subject to the agency's continuous regulation may become the
victims of uncoordinated and conflicting requirements.1" Generally,
the doctrine has been limited to questions of fact and questions re-
quiring the skills of administrative specialists." Where only questions
of law are involved in a controversy, direct application for relief must
be made to the courts."s
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a restrictive rule but
is used by the courts to give them freedom in determining whether
they should take jurisdiction over a case at hand. In a leading case
discussing the doctrine 4 the United States Supreme Court said, "No
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of
the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be
aided by its application in the particular litigation."'" In determining
if these reasons" are present and if a plaintiff should pursue his ad-
73 Davis, Administrative Law § 19.09 (1958).
"Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review,
and Primary Jurisdiction, 28 Texas L. Rev. 376, 400 (1950).
'Spartan Drilling Co. v. Bull, 221 Ark. 168, 252 S.W.2d 408 (1952); Kavanaugh v.
Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 231 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-Waco) error ref.
103 Davis, Administrative Law § 19.01 (1958).
11 Ibid.
"aGreat No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
1SKovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
" United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
15 Id. at 64.
1 Davis cites as reasons for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction:
(1) enforcement of a claim may require the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body;
(2) there is a need for orderly and sensible coordination of the work of agen-
cies and courts;
(3) a court confronted with problems within an agency's area of specializa-
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ministrative remedy, a court may properly use its own discretion."
However, this discretion can only be applied in the absence of clear
statutory language conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the adminis-
trative body.18
The discretionary power to refuse jurisdiction has been exercised
by courts in other areas of the law. For example, in the Pullman case,
19
the federal courts adopted the "doctrine of abstention." Under that
doctrine, even though federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked
in order to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute or an
administrative order, the federal court, in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion, normally will stay the action pending an interpretation of
the challenged statute or order by the state courts. A state ruling
may then alleviate the necessity for deciding the federal constitutional
question."e The United States Supreme Court encourages this re-
striction on the scope of federal jurisdiction for two reasons: (1)
because of a scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the
state governments; and (2) to insure smooth working of the federal
judiciary.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved such a use of
discretion by a lower court in staying proceedings where the question
involved a state statute and the state court had not yet ruled on it."
Thus, by analogy it is apparent that judicial appraisal of the need for
resort to administrative judgment is based on the discretion of the
court before which the question arises. Authorities agree" that judi-
cial discretion should be exercised with caution and that the courts
should be careful not to abuse their discretion nor freely to cede their
jurisdiction. It has been stated:
No discretion has any business to be wholly free; no discretion has
any business to be truly unique in exercise. To be right discretion,
tion should have the advantage of whatever contribution the agency can
make to the solution;
(4) uniformity can be secured if determination of the issue is left to the
agency. 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 19.09 (1958).
"rNeely v. United States, 285 F.2d 438, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
"SSpartan Drilling Co. v. Bull, 221 Ark. 168, 252 S.W.2d 408 (1952); Kavanaugh v.
Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 231 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-Waco) error ref.
'9 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
20 1A Moore, Federal Practice 2101 (1961).
2' Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
"2 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). The Court
has also held, on motion to dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens, that whether the
offer of a litigant, opposing the motion to guarantee that witnesses from without the juris-
diction are present at the trial, should be accepted rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). The principle of forum
non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.
"Thomas Corp. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1955); Young v. Garret, 159
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1947); Bowles v. Simon, 145 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1944); Cohen
v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 726 (6th Cir. 1942).
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to be lawful exercise of discretion (though there be neither rule nor
precedent nor likelihood of repetition), the action so far as it affects
any man or group adversely must be undertaken with a feeling, explicit
or implicit, of willingness, of readiness, to do the like again, if, or,
and when a like case may arise.24
In the instant case, the court, in holding that the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction did not apply, reasoned that since the Legislature
had not specifically delegated to the Railroad Commission the ques-
tion of subsurface trespass or sand fracturing, the courts were not
ousted from jurisdiction. The court could have found concurrent
jurisdiction in the Railroad Commission and by exercising its dis-
cretion could have allowed the Commission to make the initial de-
cision under the primary jurisdiction doctrine." However, the court
chose to take jurisdiction and thereby bypassed the administrative
agency. In so doing, it seemed to guard closely its jurisdiction over a
question which it felt was inherently judicial in nature.27 There is
little doubt that the courts have the power to determine whether a
subsurface trespass is occurring or is about to occur, and there is
certainly no indication that the court abused its discretion in making
the initial decision.
The principal case implies that courts may use their own discretion
to determine whether the court or an administrative agency should
make the initial decision. Unfortunately, opinions based on a court's
discretion rather than a rule of law are of little value as precedent
and make the practicing lawyer's task more difficult. Indeed, it is
difficult to anticipate from prior case law the manner in which a
court will exercise its discretion. There is no doubt that the principal
case is sound in result, but the fact that other courts can use their
own discretion in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
strips the case of most of its precedential value. Thus, the problems
2 4 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 217 (1960).
25 Factors the court used in deciding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not
apply were:
(1) the Legislature had not specifically delegated to the Commission the ques-
tion of subsurface trespass or sand fracturing;
(2) the Commission itself asserted no such power;
(3) the Commission had made no rules regarding the subject though re-
quested to do so by Defendant;
(4) no administrative discretion was involved because the Commission would
have no discretion to authorize the trespass;
(5) this was not a question of how a well should be completed but where
it was completed;
(6) the question presented was primarily judicial in nature. See 344 S.W.2d
at 414, 415, 418.
26 See Davis, supra note 8.
27344 S.W.2d at 415.
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raised by the primary jurisdiction doctrine will have to be obviated by
careful drafting of statutes so that there will be exclusive jurisdiction
in either an agency or a court.
Robert T. Gowan
Torts-Safety Responsibility Law-Constitutionality
Defendant struck a horse while driving a motor vehicle. Under the
Colorado Safety Responsibility Statute1 Defendant was required to
show that he had sufficient insurance to cover his potential liability
or secure a release from the other party to the accident. If he could
not satisfy either of these requirements then he was required to de-
posit an amount deemed by the Colorado Director of Revenue to be
sufficient to cover any damages which might be assessed against him.
Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the statute and his
operator's license was revoked without a hearing. He was later
arrested for driving without a license. Held: The revocation of De-
fendant's operator's license without a hearing is a deprivation of a
property right without due process of law, and the statute' authoriz-
ing suspension is unconstitutional. People v. Nothaus, - Colo. -
363 P.2d 180 (1961).
Safety responsibility legislation is designed to alleviate the prob-
lem of the irresponsible driver who uses the highway without suffi-
cient financial resources to compensate for any damage he may do.'
Such legislation seeks to insure that a wronged party who proves
fault in a suit instituted for damages will not have "an empty judg-
ment."' Two basic statutory forms are used to encourage the financial
responsibility of automobile drivers. The most simple plan is com-
pulsory liability insurance, which has been adopted in Massachusetts.!
It requires the owner of an automobile to have a designated minimum
amount of insurance covering any personal injury or death occurring
in a motor vehicle accident.! The penalty for non-compliance is re-
vocation of the vehicle's registration.! The second form, safety re-
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-7 (1954).
2Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-7 (1954).
'See Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1, 5 (1950).
4 Department of Public Safety v. Gillaspie, 254 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952-
San Antonio), aff'd, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953).
'Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34A-J (1954).6 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34A (1954). The amount of coverage required is
$5,000 for each person injured or killed and $10,000 for any one accident resulting in
death to more than one person.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34H (1954) (Revocation of registration suspends the
use of that automobile by the operator.). For a criticism of this type legislation see Braun,
The Need for Revision of Financial Responsibility Legislation, 40 Ill. L. Rev. 237 (1945).
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sponsibility legislation, requires the deposit of security after an
accident and is the more usual form of statutory relief. The Connecti-
cut statute, enacted in 1925 and since repealed, is the forerunner of
all the "security" type legislation." That statute required one to give
proof of financial responsibility only as to future operations of ve-
hicles and the satisfaction of judgments.9 In 1937 New Hampshire
enacted a statute" which required the operator to deposit security
upon the occurrence of an accident or risk the suspension of his
operator's license. This act was the basis for the model safety responsi-
bility acts of the American Automobile Association and the National
Conference on Street and Highway Safety.11 Generally, statutes based
upon the model acts"9 require a report of all accidents resulting in
injury, death, or property damage over a certain amount." Within a
specified time after the official charged with administering the stat-
ute1 4 receives the report, the driver must make a deposit of security.
The amount required is within the discretion of the designated official
and is set at an amount which will be sufficient to satisfy any judg-
ments for damages resulting from the accident."1 The security may be
either a bond for the required amount" or a deposit of money or
securities."' Statutory exceptions are made for persons with a specified
amount of insurance" and for accidents without injury or damage.'"
Most states require no preliminary hearing and no determination of
fault prior to suspension."
'Conn. Laws ch. 183 (1925), repealed by Conn. Laws ch. 254 (1931).
'As pointed out by Braun, supra note 7, at 240, this type of statute has not been suc-
cessful and has proved unpopular.
'°N.H. Laws ch. 161-208 (1937), as amended, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 268:1-27
(1955).
"' The two acts are substantially the same.
" See also the Texas act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 6701h (1960). Compare Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-1 to -9 (1954).
"
1 E.g., Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 13-7-6 (1954); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.1-65
(Page 1954); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h (1960). The failure to file a report
results in suspension.
14 In Colorado the official who administers the article is the Director of Revenue. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-2 (1954). In Texas it is the Department of Public Safety which
administers the statute. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h, § 2 (1960).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-7 (1954); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h, §5
(1960).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-27 (1954); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h, §
9 (1960). Under the Texas statute the Department of Public Safety sets the form of
security.
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-28 (1954).
aSTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h, § 5(c) (1960), provides for insurance in the
amount of $5,000 per death or injury in any one accident or $10,000 for the death or
injury of two or more persons in any one accident. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-7 (2)
(1954).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-7(2) (1954); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h,
5 6(c) (1960).
" The Texas and Colorado statutes do not require a finding of fault. Texas specifically
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Safety responsibility legislation has been held constitutional in a
majority of the states which have adopted the plan. 1 In Rosenblum v.
Griffin2 the pioneer New Hampshire act s was attacked on the ground
that suspension of an operator's license without regard to fault and
without a hearing is a deprivation of due process of law.24 The court
in that case answered that the operation of an automobile is a privi-
lege "which could be withheld at the state's pleasure."2 The basis for
the decision was that "securing redress for injured highway travelers
is a proper subject of police regulation." 2 However, in the more
recent leading decision of Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Ve-
hicles" the California Supreme Court, when faced with the same
question, held that use of the public highways was a "right." 8 The
court held that suspension of this "right" without a hearing did not
violate due process of law "if reasonably justified by a compelling
public interest" and if the decision were subject to subsequent judicial
review." In Reitz v. Mealeys° a claim of denial of due process of law
was made by one whose license and registration had been revoked for
failure to satisfy a judgment for damages. The United States Supreme
Court dismissed the claim on grounds that the safety responsibility
statute was a reasonable regulation and an additional means of en-
forcing the judgment.2 ' The Court utilizes a test based upon reason-
ableness and public necessity in cases involving governmental action
without a hearing. In addition, there is the requirement that there
be subsequent judicial review of the action.
The majority in the principal case ignored rulings in other juris-
allows judicial review in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701h, § 2 (1960).
22Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950);
De Vries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68, 44 N.W.2d 872 (1950); Ragland v. Wallace, 80 Ohio
App. 210, 70 N.E.2d 118 (1946); Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459,
259 S.W.2d 177 (1953); State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
2289 N.H. 314, 197 Atd. 701 (1938).
22 N.H. Laws ch. 161-208 (1937), as amended, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §5 268:1-27
(1955).
24 This was the first challenge to the early New Hampshire statute.
2Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 Atl. 701 (1938).
26 Ibid.
2735 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
28 Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, supra note 27, at 5.
29 Ibid. The court in the Escobedo case found authority for subsequent judicial review
by mandamus proceedings in Cal. Vehicle Code § 317 (1935), as amended, Cal. Vehicle
Code § 14104-06.
30 314 U.S. 33 (1941). The case involved the New York statute which requires sus-
pension of operators' licenses for non-satisfaction of judgments. New York Vehicle & Traffic
Law § 94(b).
3'314 U.S. at 37.
22 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (assessment of tax without a hearing).
"s Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442 (1944) (prices set without hearing under
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).
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dictions holding safety responsibility legislation of various types con-
stitutional. It is not clear whether the decision was based upon the
due process clause of the United States Constitution34 or the due
process clause of the Colorado Constitution.35 However, the use of a
motor vehicle was termed a property right under the Colorado Con-
stitution." The taking of such a right without a hearing was consider-
ed a taking without due process of law.3' The majority cited no cases
in support of its position, stating that on a "matter so obviously basic
and fundamental no additional citation of authority is required."3
In striking down the statute, the court relied entirely on the failure
to provide for a hearing prior to the suspension of the operator's
license. Colorado expressly provides for subsequent judicial review in
all cases involving cancellation, suspension, or revocation of opera-
tors' licenses." However, this provision for judicial review of suspen-
sions was not taken into consideration by the court. In other cases
upholding governmental action without a hearing, provisions for
subsequent judicial review have been considered determinative by the
United States Supreme Court," and by the California court in Esco-
bedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles.4 The court in the instant
case, refusing to follow precedent from other jurisdictions, stated that
those jurisdictions had "overlooked basic constitutional guarantees"4
and struck down the statute.
The dilemma presented by the instant case cannot be resolved by
resort to a standard based on whether the use of the highways is a
"right" or a "privilege." The basic test must be whether the pro-
cedure for suspension of an operator's license satisfies the standards
for due process established in cases of governmental action without a
hearing. Cases involving safety responsibility legislation and suspen-
sion of operators' licenses establish that the lack of a prior hearing is
not determinative. The controlling factors must be (1) whether the
34 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law ... "
" Colo. Const. art. II, § 25: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law .. "
3' Colo. Const. art. II, § 3: "All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable
rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness."
07363 P.2d at 182.
as363 P.2d at 183.
"'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3-28 (Supp. 1960); see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6701h, § 2 (1960).
4Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
442 (1944).
4' 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1, 6 (1950).
4'363 P.2d at 183.
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suspension is justified by "compelling public interest," and (2)
whether there are provisions for subsequent judicial review that will
safeguard against completely arbitrary proceedings with no possi-
bility of review. It would appear that these factors are present in the
instant case but that the court has refused either to recognize or
accept them. In so doing the court has ignored persuasive authority




Plaintiff's wife was admitted to Defendant hospital as a paying
patient. When taking necessary blood tests, a laboratory technician,
an employee of Defendant, negligently failed to mark the patient's
name or identification on the blood sample tube at her bedside. As
a result several unmarked tubes were confused with the wife's blood
sample, and she received a blood transfusion of a different type
from her own. The error resulted in her death. Plaintiff sued the
hospital in his own right and as his wife's administrator for out-of-
pocket expenses, loss of his wife's services, and for her wrongful
death. The trial court held the Defendant hospital liable. Held,
affirned: A charitable, non-profit hospital is no longer immune
from liability for injuries to patients caused by the negligence of
its employees. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105
N.W.2d 1 (1960).
A charitable institution is a corporation organized for purely
benevolent, charitable, religious, or educational purposes and not
for financial gain.' The fact that a charity receives payment for its
services from the beneficiaries, i.e., recipients of the benefits of the
charity, or makes small profits from its operations, will not affect
its character as a charity so long as the money is used for charitable
purposes.! Thus, schools, universities, and hospitals which are not
operated for financial gain are charitable institutions even though a
fee is charged for their services.' A slight majority of the jurisdic-
' Enell v. Baptist Hosp., 45 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931-Galveston) error ref.
'Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943); Scott
v. Rice Institute, 178 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944-Galveston) error ref.; Enell v.
Baptist Hosp., 45 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931-Galveston) error ref.
'City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W.2d 872 (1937); Baylor Univ. v. Boyd,
18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-Dallas) no writ hist.; Scott v. All Saints Hosp., 203
S.W. 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918-Ft. Worth) no writ hist.
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tions in the United States grant a charitable institution immunity
from liability for its employees' negligent acts which result in in-
juries to beneficiaries of its services.' This charitable immunity
doctrine is based on old English cases which have since been over-
ruled.' The extent of the immunity conferred, however, varies among
the different jurisdictions. Some states grant complete immunity,'
while a few jurisdictions allow recovery to paying patients, as dis-
tinguished from non-paying patients." Several states allow recovery
by strangers and employees, as distinguished from beneficiaries.' Still
others impose liability for administrative negligence, as distinguished
from medical negligence.! Finally, some states impose liability where
the assets of the charity will not be depleted by the plaintiff's re-
covery, e.g., where the charity carries liability insurance. 0 A large
minority of jurisdictions, in refusing to grant any immunity to
charitable institutions, hold the charity liable under the established
doctrine of respondeat superior."
' Prosser, Torts 786-87 (2d ed. 1955). For a state-by-state survey of the current status
of the charitable immunity doctrine, see 36 Notre Dame Law. 93 (1960).
' Massachusetts, in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
529 (1876), was the first American court to declare charities to be immune from tort li-
ability. That court relied upon the English case, Holliday v. Vestry of the Parrish of St.
Leonard, 11 C.B. (n.s.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861), which followed dictum from
Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839). The dictum from the
Duncan case was overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, [1866] 1 H.L. 93. The Holli-
day case was overruled in Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, [1871] 6 Q.B. 214.
6 E.g., Cabbiness v. City of North Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957);
Springer v. Federated Church, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955); Landgraver v. Emanuel
Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955); Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368
Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
'Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Lyon v. Tumwater
Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955) (immunity from non-
paying beneficiaries), limiting Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d
162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953). Contra, Penaloza v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 304 S.W.2d 203
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957-Eastland) error ref. n.r.e.; St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164
S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914-Dallas) error ref. It might be noted here that the Texas
law on this point is set out erroneously in Prosser, Torts 787 n.67 (2d ed. 1955).
'St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924); Basabo v. Salvation
Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 At. 120 (1912); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul,
131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921). Texas allows employees to recover but not strangers (at
least where there is no administrative negligence). Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton,
142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943) (strangers); Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W.
518 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919) (employees); Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-El Paso) error ref. n.r.e. (employees); Scott v. Rice
Institute, 178 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944-Galveston) error ref. (strangers).
'Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943); Enell v.
Baptist Hosp., 45 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931-Galveston) error ref.; Baylor Univ.
v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-Dallas) no writ hist. Administrative negli-
gence is negligence in hiring or retaining employees, or negligence in selecting or supplying
safe instrumentalities. Medical negligence is negligence by an act of an employee.
55 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Howard v. South Baltimore Gen.
Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App.
135, 127 S.W.2d 284 (1938).
" 105 N.W.2d at 13. It should be noted that Wisconsin relied on the principal case in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There are several different theories upon which the doctrine of
charitable immunity is said to rest."2 The prevailing theory of im-
munity, the "trust fund" theory, treats charitable assets as a trust
fund which the donor intended exclusively for charitable purposes;
payment of any of this fund to satisfy a tort judgment would en-
tirely frustrate such donative intent and would dissipate the trust
funds, thereby depriving the favored class or the public of the
charity's benefits.1 On the other hand, the "waiver" theory holds
that a beneficiary, by accepting the charity's benefits, impliedly
agrees to waive any right to bring a tort action.' It has also been
stated that the exemption of public charities from tort liability is
based upon public policy; the theory is that public policy forbids
the crippling or destroying of charities established for the benefit
of the public merely to compensate one or more individuals for in-
juries inflicted by the negligence of the corporation, its superior
officers and agents, or its servants or employees. The principle is that
in organized society the rights of the individual must, in some in-
stances, suffer injury without compensation and be subordinated to
the public good, so that the public will not be deprived of the bene-
fit of the charity."2
Although Texas grants immunity to charitable institutions, a
distinction between negligence in hiring and retaining employees or
in furnishing safe instrumentalities, i.e., administrative negligence,
and negligence by an act of an employee, i.e., medical negligence, is
recognized. Liability is imposed only in the former situations, re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff is a charity or a paying patient" or
abolishing immunity from paying patients. Kojis v. Doctor's Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107
N.W.2d 131, modified, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961) (makes the abolition prospective). Ken-
tucky has also overruled the doctrine of charitable immunity; the Kentucky court discussed
the principal case. Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961).
"a For an excellent and thorough discussion of the various theories, see President &
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905); Jensen v. Maine
Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910); Blatt v. George H. Nettleton
Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d 344 (1955) (holding that the doctrine
of charitable immunity does not protect the funds of a charity which are received from
enterprises totally unconnected with the charitable purposes and overruling the Eads case,
infra, to that extent only); Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615
(1946) (holding that the doctrine rests on the trust fund theory and public policy) ; Eads v.
Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930) (trust fund theory).
"4Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938),
overruled, Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041
(1956) (charity liable to paying patients for medical negligence, but theory is the same);
St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924).
"Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
"°Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943);
Enell v. Baptist Hosp., 45 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931-Galveston) error ref.;
Baylor Univ. v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-Dallas) no writ hist. A
charitable institution may also be liable for negligence of its officers or managing directors
1962]
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whether he was a beneficiary of the trust or a stranger to it.' Thus,
Texas has adopted a modified "trust fund" theory. In Michigan,
prior to the instant case, the "trust fund" theory of charitable im-
munity was followed." Liability was imposed only when the chari-
table institution was negligent in the selection and retention of its
employees or the instrumentalities used by it in carrying on and
furthering its benevolent purposes."9 Also, Michigan made no dis-
tinction between paying and non-paying patients."
The court in the instant case overruled previous Michigan cases
and held that a charitable, non-profit hospital should no longer be
held immune from tort liability to patients for injuries caused by
the negligence of its employees. This appears to be the new rule for
all charitable institutions in Michigan. The charitable immunity ex-
ception has thus been removed and the doctrine of respondeat
superior now applies to all subsequent causes of action against
charities. The court based its decision primarily on President &
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes" where the court, Justice
Rutledge writing, expertly and systematically rejected the theories
asserted in favor of the charitable immunity doctrine. 'With respect
to the "trust fund" theory, that court stated that no statistical evi-
dence had been presented to show that the mortality or crippling of
charities was greater in states which did not grant immunity than
in states which did have total or partial immunity. Furthermore,
that court pointed out that insurance is now available to protect
against possible dissipation of the trust funds. Another factor con-
sidered by the court to warrant the abolition of charitable immunity
was the cost to the victim (normally an indigent in charitable hos-
pitals) of bearing the full burden of his hospital injury. The "waiver"
theory was also rejected as being patently unfounded, since one can-
not be held to waive something voluntarily when he has no choice
in the matter, e.g., when he is unconscious upon entering the hospital.
The principal case is significant in that the court rejected the
contention that a change in the long-established doctrine of charitable
immunity was a proper subject of the legislature only." The court
in selecting or supplying safe instrumentalities. Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-El Paso) error ref. n.r.e.
"Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
"S Downes v. Harper Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894) (overruled by the
principal case).
'9DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N.W.2d 907 (1943) (overruled by
the principal case).
' Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1933)
(overruled by the principal case).
21130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
22A majority of the courts, including Michigan, have said that any change in the
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reasoned that the exception to the common law doctrine of respon-
deat superior was not made part of the law of Michigan by the legis-
lature but by the court, and similarly, it could be and would be re-
moved by the court when principles of law, logic, and justice de-
manded it.
The court in the instant case seems unquestionably to have been
correct in holding that although the various immunity theories may
have been justified when charities were small and few, they are no
longer justified in view of the tremendous growth of charitable
institutions and the availability of liability insurance. Time and
circumstances have brought about the necessity of abolishing the
immunity of charitable institutions from tort liability. Although
it may have been good public policy in the past to grant the immu-
nity, it is now good public policy to discontinue it as an exception
to the rule of respondeat superior. The first step in abolishing the
immunity rule was the holding of some courts that a paying patient
was entitled to recover. Certainly it is even more justifiable to abolish
the immunity as to non-paying patients, for they are the least able
to bear the burden.
In Texas the doctrine of charitable immunity, subject to certain
limitations, is firmly entrenched. 3 Texas courts have held that the
existence of liability insurance, which removes any fears of "trust
fund" dissipation, will not affect the immunity." Moreover, the
charitable immunity rule is a matter of policy to be determined by the legislature. DeGroot
v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N.W.2d 907 (1943) (overruled by the principal
case); Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955).
The principal case was relied on in abolishing immunity to paying patients in Wisconsin in
Kojis v. Doctor's Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, modified, 107 N.W.2d 292
(1961). However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on June 27, 1961, stated that aboli-
tion of the doctrine of charitable immunity should be "prospectively by legislation and not
retroactively by judicial ukase." Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 404 Pa.
424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961). The Pennsylvania 'court could not agree to overruling the
charitable immunity prospectively (i.e., do as the principal case did-apply it to the instant
case and to all causes of action arising after the filing of the opinion overruling the charitable
immunity). The Supreme Court of Arkansas on October 30, 1961, refused to overturn the
doctrine of charitable immunity; the court felt bound by their prior decisions. The court
based its ruling on the theory that charitable immunity from tort liability had become a
rule of property in Arkansas and should not be overturned even if the court was disposed
to do so. It is interesting to note that a majority of the court held that the charitable in-
stitution was not amenable for injuries on the theory that there was a breach of contract.
Halton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph's Hosp., -Ark.-., 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961). The
Supreme Court of Missouri on December 11, 1961, refused to overturn the doctrine of
charitable immunity. The Missouri court held that the existence of liability insurance made
no difference. The court also stressed the Missouri legislature's failure or refusal to over-
rule the doctrine. Schulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961).23 Jones v. Baylor Hosp., 284 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App 1955-Dallas) no writ hist.
There the court said that even if the rule ought to be changed, the court was bound to
apply it under the principle of stare decisis.24 Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-El Paso)
error ref. n.r.e.
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Supreme Court of Texas as late as January of 1962, refused "no
reversible error" an application for writ of error in a case where the
petitioner sought to have the doctrine of charitable immunity over-
turned."' Although a refusal of an application for writ of error "no
reversible error" means only that the supreme court agrees that the
correct result has been reached by the court of civil appeals, it would
seem to this writer that since the question of charitable immunity was
put squarely and properly before the court, its refusal to grant the
application under the facts of the case constituted acquiescence in
the immunity doctrine. Thus, it seems certain that legislative enact-
ment will be necessary to change the present Texas rule. It might
be observed that from the very latest cases" on this question, it
appears that the recent trend of other jurisdictions toward abolition
of the charitable immunity doctrine may be grinding to an un-
fortunate halt.
Todd H. Overton
" Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961-Dallas) error ref. n.r.e. Motion for rehearing was overruled on January 29, 1962.
,"See cases cited note 22 supra.
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